Hume’s Argument Against Miracles
Formulated by david-hume in his 1748 essay Of Miracles, this argument remains the foundational critique of miracle claims and prefigures modern Bayesian reasoning by centuries. 1
The Argument
Premise: Our uniform, unalterable experience of the laws of nature constitutes overwhelming evidence against any miracle.
Conclusion: The evidence against a miracle will always outweigh the evidence for it (human testimony).
Bayesian Framing
In modern Bayesian terms:
- P(E|~H): The probability that human testimony is flawed, fabricated, or mistaken
- P(E|H): The probability of the testimony given an actual miracle
Hume’s argument is that P(E|~H) is practically always higher than the probability that the laws of physics were suspended — the prior for a miracle is so low that no amount of testimony can overcome it.
Enduring Influence
Most modern critiques of bayesian-apologetics echo Hume. His argument establishes an epistemological barrier: miracle claims face a structural disadvantage in any probabilistic framework because they require the suspension of natural law — the very thing that gives probability its empirical grounding.